AI Repair
Review a specific failure or disputed claim against its original assertion, available evidence, contradictions, execution receipts and permitted repair scope. A proposed correction does not replace the authoritative record.
Proof before permission. An integrity and repair system for AI-assisted work. FAHCE separates what was claimed, what actually executed, what the evidence supports and what action is permitted next. When those states disagree, it can hold, block, quarantine or propose a bounded repair while preserving the original claim and unresolved work.
An AI system may report completion when an action never ran, cite evidence that does not support its conclusion, inherit permission from another workflow or fix one defect while quietly changing what is considered authoritative.
The failure can continue through repair, handoff and the next action. FAHCE keeps execution, evidence, claims, permissions, artifact identity and reentry separate and inspectable.
FAHCE combines a deterministic integrity engine with a protected, user-facing repair and review workspace.
Review a specific failure or disputed claim against its original assertion, available evidence, contradictions, execution receipts and permitted repair scope. A proposed correction does not replace the authoritative record.
Explore more complex, multi-step cases with evidence review, missing-proof requests, contradiction handling and repair guidance. Exploration does not grant additional permission.
Support scoped pilot access and separation between Repair and Workshop. Pilot access, case records and receipts belong to the operating environment; broader availability is not implied.
Translate structured findings into understandable explanations and next steps. An assistant may explain or propose, but cannot manufacture execution evidence, override deterministic results or grant release authority.
Capture the claim and expected result; establish actual execution and applicable evidence; identify a contradiction, missing proof or permission mismatch; and retain HOLD, BLOCK, QUARANTINE or REPAIR_REQUIRED where appropriate.
Define the repair scope, gather verification evidence, reconcile the result and permit continuation only within established proof and decision-right boundaries. Local repair does not establish whole-product or production efficacy.
These evidence classes differ. Dated core/repository proof does not automatically verify the currently deployed Worker or later confidential runtime.
Implemented states distinguish assertions from supported execution and keep evidence, contradictions, permissions and claim boundaries separately inspectable.
Founder-operated pilot testing has exercised scoped access, case intake, adjudication, receipts, export and review. The tested scope does not independently establish broader production performance.
The Python product has undergone testing, container and CI checks, security scanning, SBOM/provenance work and reproducible OCI-build testing.
Bounded Azure Container Registry and Key Vault-backed Notation publication, signing and verification evidence exists. Artifact identity is not proof that every deployed Worker version is signed or effective.
ACI, confidential-compute policy generation and private key-release integration have been exercised within defined bounds. A complete independent attestation-to-key-release chain remains unestablished.
FAHCE does not claim universal hallucination prevention, prompt-injection immunity, compliance certification, provider superiority or automatic release authority.
A successful local repair, uploaded build, zero-traffic deployment or health response does not independently prove production repair efficacy. Signed OCI custody does not establish every deployed Worker identity. Confidential-runtime proof does not establish a complete attestation/key-release chain.
Current work connects the operating repair experience with stronger execution receipts, source-to-version attribution, protected runtime evidence and controlled continuation.
Production repair behavior, confidential key release, external-pilot evidence and commercial demand each require their own proof. Evidence determines what can be claimed; authorized people and systems determine what may be done.